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An empirical analysis of the economic impact of the Major League Baseball’s post-
season on host-city economies from 1972-2001 suggests that any economic benefits from the
playoff are small or non-existent. An examination of 129 playoff series finds that any increase in
economic growth as a result of the post-season is not statistically significantly different than zero
and that a best guess of the economic impact is $6.8 million per home game. As a general
method of economic development, public support of a baseball team’s attempt to reach the
World Series should be seen as a gamble at best.
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Introduction
Major League Baseball (MLB) teams desiring public funding to help build new playing
facilities frequently claim that a new stadium is needed to allow the team to be competitive. For
many teams this claim is entirely true. New stadiums, along with the generous lease terms that
often accompany them, nearly always generate significantly higher revenue for the tenant than
the stadium they replace. To the extent that the team management turns around and spends this
extra revenue on player salaries, the extra revenue generated by a new stadium will tend to
improve a team’s performance on the field as well as on the books.
It is a well established fact that higher team payrolls are strongly correlated with winning
percentage. An examination of winning percentage and team payroll shows that between 1994
and 2000, each additional $2 million in team payroll equated to approximately one additional
regular season win. High payrolls are even more strongly related to post-season success. Since
MLB switched to its current playoff format in 1995 through the 2000 season, teams in the
highest quartile of payrolls have appeared in the playoffs 30 times compared with 15
appearances by teams in the 2
nd quartile, 1 appearance by a team in the 3
rd quartile, and 2
appearances by teams in the bottom quartile. In terms of success in the playoffs the gulf been
“haves” and the “have nots” is even wider still. Teams in the top quartile have won 168 of the
190 playoff games played since 1995 with 2
nd quartile teams winning another 20 of the 190
games. Of course, a high payroll is no guarantee of success as witnessed by such big budget
failures as the 2000 L.A. Dodgers who failed to make the playoffs with the 2
nd highest payroll in
baseball or the 1998 Baltimore Orioles who failed to even break .500 with MLB’s highest
payroll. 4
The connection between new stadiums and team success (due to increased team payrolls)
is nearly as clear. Team payrolls nearly always increase along with stadium revenues leading to
higher winning percentages and playoff appearances. This trend is most easily shown by
example. Following the opening of the SkyDome in Toronto in 1989, the Blue Jays won World
Series in 1992 and 1993 with baseball’s largest payroll. Baltimore, near the bottom of league
payrolls in 1992, went on have the 2
nd largest team payroll by 1995 after the opening of the
wildly popular Camden Yards Ballpark in 1992. Finally, Cleveland probably presents the
greatest success story of stadium construction leading to on-field success. The Cleveland
Indians, with one of baseball’s three lowest payrolls in 1992 and 1993 and a 50-year record of
post-season futility, turned around their franchise after the construction of Jacobs Field in 1994.
The Indians were among the top 3 franchises in payroll in 1996 and 1997 and made World Series
appearances in 1995 and 1997. In fact, on-field success following the opening of a new ball park
is the rule not the exception. Of the 10 clubs receiving new stadiums between 1989 and 1999, 8
made playoff appearances within 2 years of the construction of the stadium. Only Tampa Bay, a
1997 expansion franchise, and Baltimore, whose potential playoff appearance was postponed by
two years due to the 1994 MLB players’ strike,  have defied the pattern.
Of course, in large media markets such as New York City and Los Angeles, stadium
revenues represent a much smaller fraction of total team revenues, and therefore teams in these
markets can afford large payrolls despite outdated stadiums. Similarly, for older parks such as
Chicago’s Wrigley Field or Boston’s Fenway Park, the historic nature of the stadium itself may
be an attraction for many fans, and, therefore teams like the Chicago Cubs or the Boston Red
Sox can afford large payrolls because of, rather than in spite of, an old ball park. (Baade, 2000)5
It is also important to note that wins and losses in MLB are a zero-sum game as any
increases in winning percentage by a club with a new stadium must be matched by an increase in
losses for another team. The construction of Camden Yards in 1992 has prompted a boom in
stadium construction that has seen 15 new stadiums being completed during the 1992-2003
period with new stadiums being proposed or under construction for another 11 cities (Munsey
and Suppes, 2000). If 25 of baseball’s 30 teams are playing in essentially new stadiums in the
next 5 years, it is clear that not every team with a new stadium can support an above average
payroll with the above average on the field performance that generally accompanies such a
payroll. It is likely that the automatic on-field success that accompanied teams such as the Blue
Jays, Indians, Orioles, and Texas Rangers, who built new stadiums in the early stages of the
building boom, will not necessarily accrue to the most recent new builders. It is equally likely
that with so many new stadiums and the increased payrolls that accompany the new stadiums,
teams that fail to build new stadiums, especially those located in small media markets, will
increasingly likely be condemned to lower and lower positions in the win/loss standings.
While it is clear that new stadiums tend to fill the pockets of team owners and the players
they hire, it is not so clear how the economies of the communities fare in which the new
stadiums are constructed. Many studies, including Baade and Dye, 1990; Rosentraub, 1994;
Baade, 1996; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Coates and Humphreys, 1999 to name just a few, have
examined the economic impact of stadium construction. Without exception, these studies have
found that new stadiums provide little or no net economic stimulus to the communities in which
they are located.
Since new stadiums tend to improve the on-field performances of their tenant team, the6
construction of a new stadium also tends to increase the chance of a team hosting post-season
playoff games. These games potentially lead to a flurry of economic activity in the cities hosting
them. If the economic gains to the host city from hosting post-season games are very large, then
it could be rational for cities to make large investments in new stadiums in order to increase their
chances of capturing the post-season economic windfall. But the question remains, how big is
the true economic impact of these post-season “mega-events” on the host cities? 
An Overview of the World Series
Major League Baseball (MLB) determines its champion each October with the playing of
the World Series. As with any major sporting event, the World Series is often accompanied by
announcements from local chambers of commerce and economic consultants about the economic
impact that the games have on the host cities. These estimates vary widely from Series to Series.
On the low end, a study of the 1995 World Series in Atlanta placed a value of $26 million on the
Series, and the Convention and Visitors Bureau of Greater Cleveland estimated an impact of $53
million for the Indians’1997 post-season play including a $21.7 million impact directly from the
World Series itself.  On the other end of the spectrum, a study sponsored by the Florida Marlins
placed the value of their 1997 World Series appearance at $155.7 million including the entire
post-season. A second study by Kathleen Davis sponsored by the Broward (County) Economic
Development Council placed the value of the World Series alone at $61.8 million. The Chicago
Chamber of Commerce estimated the potential impact of the Chicago White Sox’ 1993 trip to
the post-season at $180 million. The highest estimate for the economic impact of the post-season
comes from the 2000 “Subway Series” between the New York Yankees and New York Mets7
where the Comptroller of New York City placed the combined value of the playoff and World
Series at nearly $250 million.
The differing estimates of the economic impact of the event are due in part to the
assumptions used by the models. Moreover, the variation is also due to the nature of the event
itself. Unlike the Super Bowl or an All-Star game, the World Series is not a single event but
rather a series of events. The World Series itself is a best-of-seven series of games played in the
cities of the competing teams. The games alternate between cities in a fashion such that each city
is guaranteed hosting a minimum of two and a maximum of four games. In order to qualify for
the World Series, each competing team has participated in a five-game (from 1969-1984) or
seven-game (from 1984-present) League Championship Series, and since 1995, teams have
participated in a five-game divisional championship series as well. Each of the playoff series
generate significant public attention and economic activity in addition to the impact of the World
Series itself. In total, a city that makes it to the World Series might host as many 11 post-season
games (including 4 World Series games), each of which can be seen as a “mini Super Bowl.” Of
course, the playoff series need not go the full 5 or 7 games and a city may host fewer games than
their opponent meaning that even a team that makes the World Series may host as few as few a 5
post-season games (including 2 World Series games). The largest economic estimates generally
assume that the city hosts the maximum number of playoff and World Series games. 
On a per game basis, the economic impact estimates in 2000 dollars range from as low as
$2 million to as high as $26.8 million with World Series games often being slightly considered
slightly more valuable than League and Division Series games.  The majority of the estimates lie
between $10 and $20 million in economic benefits per post-season home game.  8
MLB understands that it is competing for the sports entertainment dollar, and the League
believes that stadiums factor prominently into consumer decisions relating to leisure spending.
Since modern sports facilities nearly always are built with some form of public funding,
baseball’s boosters could rationalize the construction of a new stadium to a skeptical public on
the grounds that the economic impact from hosing a single World Series could potentially cover
a substantial portion of the cost of building a new stadium.
Reasons for skepticism, however, abound. The purpose of this study is to estimate the
economic impact of the post-season appearances from 1972 through 2001. The results indicate
that the economic impact of the baseball’s playoffs and post-season are not statistically
significantly different than zero, but a best guess would place the impact in the neighborhood of
the lower estimates.
Review “Mega-Event” Economic Impact Studies
The numbers quoted by MLB and city officials are generated using a standard
expenditure approach to estimating the direct economic impact of the event. The numbers are
derived by estimating the number of “visitor days” as a result of the playoffs and multiplying
that statistic by the average estimated per diem expenditures per visitor. Once an estimate of
direct impact is obtained, the total economic impact is estimated by applying a multiplier which
typically doubles the direct economic impact. Using this technique, if a mistake is made in
estimating direct expenditures, those errors are compounded in estimating indirect expenditures.
The secret to generating credible economic impact estimates using the expenditure approach is to
accurately estimate direct expenditures.  9
Precisely measuring changes in direct expenditures is fraught with difficulties. Most
prominent among them is an assessment of the extent to which spending in conjunction with the
event would have occurred in the absence of it. For example, if an estimate was sought on the
impact of a professional sporting event on a local economy, consideration would have to be
given to the fact that spending on the event may well merely substitute for spending that would
occur on something else in the local economy in the absence of the event. As pointed out by
Andrew Zimbalist, “If you buy a $100 ticket to the Series, that’s money you might have spent on
a Broadway show or food.” Therefore, if the fans are primarily indigenous to the community, an
event like the World Series may simply yield a reallocation of leisure spending while leaving
total spending unchanged. This distinction between gross and net spending has been cited by
economists as a chief reason why professional sports in general do not seem to contribute as
much to metropolitan economies as boosters claim (Baade, 1996).
One of the attributes of most mega-events is that gross and net spending changes induced
by the event are more likely to converge. Spending at a mega-event is more likely to be
categorized as export spending since most of it is thought to be undertaken by people from
outside the community. According to the Sports Management Research Institute, 87% of
attendees at the 1999 Super Bowl were from outside the host city of Miami. The World Series is
a much different event than the Super Bowl, however. First of all, the Super Bowl and is played
at a neutral site selected several years prior to the game. This means fans from both participating
teams must travel to the host city to see their team. Furthermore, sports fans from non-
participating cities may well attend the game since travel plans can be made in advance. In the
World Series, each of the participating teams serves as a host city for the games. Fans of one10
team have little incentive to the opponent’s city to watch games since some portion of the games
can be attended at home. Furthermore, fans from non-participating cities may have difficulty
attending the games since travel plans cannot be made in advance. At the 1997 World Series in
Florida, only between 13 percent and 20 percent of fans at the games were visitors from outside
the south Florida region.  In comparison to the All-Star Game or the Super Bowl, the World
Series is much more of a local event, and hence less likely to increase net incomes of local
residents.
Spending by local residents is not the only potentially significant source of bias in
estimating direct expenditures. While surveys on expenditures by those attending an event,
complete with a question on place of residence, may well provide insight on spending behavior
for those patronizing the event, such a technique offers no data on changes in spending by
residents not attending the event. It is conceivable that some residents may dramatically change
their spending during an event in order to avoid the congestion in the venue’s environs.
Similarly, while hotel rooms during a mega-event may be filled with baseball fans, if hotels in
the host city are normally at or near capacity during the time period in which the event is held, it
may be that mega-event visitors are simply crowding out other potential visitors. In general, a
fundamental shortcoming of economic impact studies is not with information on spending for
those who are included in a direct expenditure survey, but rather with the lack of information on
the spending behavior for those who are not. 
 A second potentially significant source of bias in economic impact studies relates to
leakages from the circular flow of spending. For example, if the host economy is at or very near
full employment or if the work requires specialized skills, it may be that the labor essential to11
conducting the event resides in other communities. To the extent that this is true, then the
indirect spending that constitutes the multiplier effect must be adjusted to reflect this leakage of
income and subsequent spending.  
Labor is not the only factor of production that may repatriate income. For example, even
if hotels experience higher than normal occupancy rates during a mega-event, then the question
must be raised about the fraction of increased earnings that remain in the community if the hotel
is a nationally owned chain. In short, to assess the impact of mega-events, a balance of payments
approach must be utilized. Since the input-output models used in even the most sophisticated ex
ante analyses are based on fixed relationships between inputs and outputs, such models do not
account for the expenditure complications associated with full employment and capital
ownership noted here. 
As an alternative to estimating the change in expenditures and associated changes in
economic activity, those who provide goods and services directly in accommodating the event
could be asked how their activity has been altered by the event. Unfortunately, “this requires that
each proprietor have a model of what would have happened during that time period had the sport
event not taken place. This is an extreme requirement which severely limits this technique.”
(Davidson, 1999).
Economists using different approaches to estimate the impact of similar sporting “mega-
events” have typically found much smaller economic impacts. For example, Phil Porter (1999)
used regression analysis to determine that the economic impact of the Super Bowl on the host
city was statistically insignificant, that is not measurably different from zero. Likewise, Baade
and Matheson (2000) challenged a MLB claim that the annual All-Star Game contributes $7512
million to the host city economy. Their study of taxable sales data and employment data
concluded that the All-Star Game was actually associated with lower than expected economic
activity for host cities.  Another study by Coates and Humphreys (2002) examining economic
growth and appearances in the baseball, basketball, and football playoffs found no statistically
significant impact from hosting any of these major championships.
Since the expenditure approach to projecting the economic impact of mega-events is
most commonly used by league and city officials to generate economic impact estimates, it is
useful to compare the results generated by economic models to the estimates quoted by league
officials that were derived using an expenditure approach. In the next sections of the paper, the
models that are used to estimate the impact of the post-season are detailed.
The Model
The economic activity generated by the playoffs and the World Series is likely to be
small relative to the overall economy, and isolating the event’s impact, therefore, is not a trivial
task. To this end we have selected explanatory variables from past models to help establish what
income would have been in the absence of the World Series and then compare that estimate to
actual income levels to assess the contribution of the event. The success of this approach
depends on our ability to identify those variables that explain the majority of observed variation
in growth in income in those cities that have hosted the World Series.
   One technique is to represent a statistic for a city for a particular year as a deviation from
the average value for that statistic for cohort cities for that year. Such a representation over time
will, in effect, “factor out” general urban trends and developments. For example, if we identify a13
particular city’s growth in income as 10 percent over time, but cities in general are growing by 4
percent, then we would conclude that this city’s pattern deviates from the norm by 6 percent. It is
the 6 percent deviation that requires explanation and not the whole 10 percent for our purposes in
this study. Furthermore, if history tells us that a city that experiences a growth in income that is 5
percent above the national average both before and during a mega-event, then it would be
misguided to attribute that additional 5 percent to the mega-event. If during the Series, the city
continued to exhibit income increases 5 percent above the national norm, the logical conclusion
is that the World Series simply supplanted other economic developments that contributed to the
city’s above-average rate of growth.
Given the number and variety of variables found in regional growth models and the
inconsistency of findings with regard to coefficient size and significance, criticisms of any single
model could logically focus on the problems posed by omitted variables. Any critic, of course,
can claim that a particular regression suffers from omitted-variable bias, it is far more
challenging to address the problems posed by not including key variables in the analysis. 
In explaining regional or metropolitan growth patterns, at least some of the omitted
variable problem can be addressed through representing relevant variables as deviations from
city norms. This leaves the scholar with a more manageable task, namely that of identifying
those factors that explain city growth after accounting for the impact of those forces that
generally have affected national, regional or MSA growth. For example, a variable is not needed
to represent the implications of federal revenue sharing if such a change affected all cohort cities
in similar ways. 
Following the same logic, other independent variables should also be normalized, that is14
represented as a deviation from an average value for MSAs or as a fraction of the MSA average.
For example, a firm’s decision to locate a new factory in city i depends not on the absolute level
of wages in city i, but city i’s wage relative to those of all cities with whom it competes for labor
and other resources. What we propose, therefore, is an equation for explaining metropolitan
income growth which incorporates those variables that the literature identifies as important, but
specified in such a way that those factors common to MSAs are implicitly included. 
The models presented here are designed to predict changes in income attributable to the
World Series in host cities between 1970 and 2001.  The cohort of cities used in the sample
includes the seventy-three metropolitan areas that represent the largest MSAs in the United
States by population over the time period 1970-2001 including every MSA that was among the
largest sixty MSAs at some time during that period.  While the choice of seventy-three cities is
largely arbitrary, the list was expanded to include all metropolitan areas that have hosted the
World Series, cities with professional sports franchises (with the exception of Green Bay, WI),
and MSAs with professional sports aspirations. The data used are described more fully in
Appendix 1. 
Traditionally, researchers such as Coates and Humphreys (2002) and Baade and
Matheson (2000) have used fixed effect models on this type of panel data with a dummy variable
included for the sporting event(s) and individual dummy variables included for each city in the
model to account for regional differences in economic growth. Equation (1) represents the model
used to predict changes in income for host cities.  
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For each time period t, Yt
i is the real personal income and ∆Yt
i is the change in real
personal income in the ith metropolitan statistical area (MSA), n is the number of cities in the
sample, Wt
i is the nominal wages in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all cities in
the sample, Gt
i is the state and local taxes in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all
cities in the sample, POPt
i is the log population of the ith city, WSt
i is a dummy variable for
hosting the World Series, and ,t
i is the stochastic error.  OTt
i is a dummy variable that represents
any significant city-specific economic influences that cannot be explained by other variables in
the model including the effects of the oil booms of the 1970s and the subsequent oil bust of the
1980s on oil patch cities of New Orleans and Houston, the effects of Hurricane Andrew on the
economy of South Florida, and the economic consequences of the tech boom in Silicon Valley. 
C
i is a vector of dummy variables representing the fixed effect for each city i, and t is a vector of
dummy variables representing each year t representing the business cycle.
The results of ordinary least-squares regression using equation (1) are shown in Table 2. 
The coefficient (0.4058%) and t-statistic (1.409) on the Super Bowl variable indicate that hosting
the Super Bowl is associated with an increase in city personal income growth of 0.4% but that
this figure is not statistically significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  
While the use of fixed effect models is widespread due to their simplicity, they present
numerous theoretical and applied difficulties that make their use undesirable when they can be
avoided.  First, the assumptions implicit in the model are quite extreme in that it is assumed the
only difference in city growth rates is a fixed percentage in each period. This belies the fact that
some cities (such as Detroit or San Jose) are strongly influenced by cyclical industries, and
others have experienced growth spurts or slowdowns at varying times in their recent history.  To16
assume that every economic variable affects every city’s economic growth in exactly the same
way is an absurd albeit often necessary assumption. Next heteroscedasticity is identified as a
problem since the variability of the residuals differs widely between cities. Finally, because the
size of the economies of the host cities varies widely, it is difficult to translate the coefficient
indicating a 0.4% increase in economic growth into a convenient dollar figure. For these reasons
a second method is tried, and equation (2) represents the revised model used to predict changes
in income for host cities.  
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The variables remain the same as in equation (1) except for the Super Bowl variable.  SBt
i
is now a vector of dummy variables representing the Super Bowl with a separate dummy
variable being included for each year a particular city has hosted the game.  The major change is
that equation (2) was separately estimated for each of the eleven different metropolitan areas that
have hosted at least one Super Bowl since 1970.  Not every variable specified in equation (2)
emerged as statistically significant for every city.  The decision of whether to include an
independent variable known to be a good predictor in general but failing to be statistically
significant in a particular city’s case is largely an arbitrary one.  The inclusion of theoretically
valuable variables that are idiosyncratically insignificant will improve some measures of fit such
as R-squared but may reduce other measures such as adjusted R-squared or the standard error of
the estimate.  Since the purpose of equation (2) is to produce predictive rather than explanatory17
results, variables were included in the regression equation as long as they improved predictive
success, and as long as the omission of the variable did not significantly alter the coefficients of
the remaining variables.  Table 3 presents the regression results for all cities with the
combination of variables that minimizes the standard error of the estimate (SEE).  
As mentioned previously, rather than specifying all the variables that may explain
metropolitan growth, we attempted to simplify the task by including only the independent
variables that are common to cities in general and the ith MSA in particular.  In effect we have
devised a structure that attempts to identify the extent to which the deviations from the growth of
cities in general (Σ∆Yt
i /nt ) and city i’s secular growth ∆Y
i
t-1, are attributable to deviations in
certain costs of production (wages and taxes) or demand-side variables (relative income levels,
wages, and taxes).
Relative values of wages and tax burdens are all expected to help explain a city’s growth
rate in income as it deviates from the sample norm and its own secular growth path. As
mentioned above, past research has not produced consistency with respect to the signs and
significance of these independent variables.  It is not at all clear, for example, whether high
levels of relative wages lead to higher or lower income growth.  A similar situation exists with
relative levels of taxation.  As a consequence, a priori expectations are uncertain with regard to
the signs of the coefficients.  That should not be construed as an absence of theory about key
economic relationships.  As noted earlier, the models include those variables that previous
scholarly work found important.  
Everything discussed in this section of the paper to this point is intended to define the regression
analysis that will be used to assess changes in income attributable to baseball’s post-season in18
host cities between 1972 and 2001. Equation (1) represents the model used to predict changes in
income for host cities.
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For each time period t, Yt
i is the real income and ∆Yt
i is the change in real income (GDP)
in the ith metropolitan statistical area (MSA), n is the number of cities in the sample, Wt
i is the
nominal wages in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all cities in the sample, Tt
i is the
state and local taxes in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all cities in the sample,
TRt
i is an annual trend variable, and ,t
i is the stochastic error.  OTt
i is a dummy variable used in
certain cities’s regression equations to specify city-specific events such the significant economic
influence of Hurricane Andrew on the economy of Miami and the effect of the oil boom and bust
on oil patch cities such as Denver, Ft. Worth, and Houston.  The cohort of cities used in the
sample includes the largest seventy-three metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the United States by
population over the time period 1970-2000.  The data used are described more fully in Appendix
1.
From this point there are two paths that can be taken. The traditional approach as used by
Baade and Matheson (2001) and Coates and Humphries (2002) is to use a fixed effects model
with all of the variables included as well as a dummy variable for each individual city and a
variable for the number of post-season games hosted. The post-season variable takes a  
For the purposes of this analysis, the functional form is linear in all the variables included in19
equation (1).  The equation was estimated for 25 different metropolitan areas representing all of
the cities that have hosted at least one baseball post-season series since 1972.  Not every variable
specified in equation (1) emerged as statistically significant for every city.  The decision of
whether to include an independent variable known to be a good predictor in general but failing to
be statistically significant in a particular city’s case is largely an arbitrary one.  The inclusion of
theoretically valuable variables that are idiosyncratically insignificant will improve some
measures of fit such as R-squared but may reduce other measures such as adjusted R-squared or
the standard error of the estimate.  Since the purpose of equation (1) is to produce predictive
rather than explanatory results, variables were included in the regression equation as long as they
improved predictive success.  Table 1 presents the regression results for all cities with the
combination of variables that minimizes the standard error of the estimate (SEE).  For about half
of the cities, autocorrelation was identified as a significant problem, and, therefore, the
Cochrane-Orcutt method was used for cities where its use again reduced the SEE.
As mentioned previously, rather than specifying all the variables that may explain
metropolitan growth, we attempted to simplify the task by including only the independent
variables that are common to cities in general and the ith MSA in particular.  In effect we have
devised a structure that attempts to identify the extent to which a city’s deviation from the
growth of cities in general (Σ∆Yt
i /nt ) and it’s own past growth (∆Y
i
t-1) are attributable to
deviations in certain costs of production (wages and taxes) or demand-side variables (relative
income levels, wages, and taxes).
Relative values wages and tax burdens are all expected to help explain a city’s growth
rate in income as it deviates from the sample norm and its own secular growth path. As20
mentioned above, past research has not produced consistency with respect to the signs and
significance of these independent variables.  It is not at all clear, for example, whether high
levels of relative wages and relative taxes lead to higher or lower income growth. As a
consequence, a priori expectations are uncertain with regard to the signs of these coefficients. 
That should not be construed as an absence of theory about key economic relationships.  As
noted earlier, the models include those variables that previous scholarly work found important.  
Results
The model identified in Table 1 for each city is used to estimate income growth for each
city for each year that data are available, 1972-2000.  City specific wage data are not available
for all cities prior to 1972, so only playoffs since 1972 are examined.  In addition, data are not
available for Canadian cities, and therefore post season appearances by Toronto and Montreal
are excluded from the study.  Finally, due to the 1994-95 MLB players’ strike, no World Series
was held in 1994.  This leaves 129 post-season appearances to be examined.
Once income growth is estimated by the model, the predicted income growth is then
compared to the actual income growth that each MSA experienced during the year(s) in which it
hosted the playoff games.  Using the difference between actual and predicted growth compared
with the size of the host city’s economy, a dollar value estimate of this difference can be
determined.  If it is assumed that any difference between actual and predicted income can be
accounted for by the presence of the playoffs, this method allows for a dollar estimate of the
impact of the games on host cities. 
Table 2 shows the host city, the city’s real income (in 2000 dollars), predicted growth,21
estimated growth, the difference between predicted and actual growth (the residual), the
standardized residual, and the dollar value of the difference in growth for each year.  In addition,
the total number of post-season games hosted by the city is shown for each year.  The
standardized residuals for each city are calculated by taking the difference between the actual
and the predicted growth rates and dividing by the corresponding SEE from Table 1.  For
example, the actual income (GDP) growth rate for Oakland in 1972 was 5.414 percent while the
model predicted only a 5.066 percent increase in income corresponding to a residual of 0.348
percent and a standardized residual of 0.295.  Based on Oakland’s $38.6 billion economy, this
0.348 percent difference corresponds to an economy that produced income $134 million in
excess of what would have expected during 1972 if the city had not hosted the championship. 
The $134 million can be interpreted as the combined contribution of the League Championship
Series and World Series to the Oakland economy.
The statistics recorded in Table 2 suggest two things worth noting.  First, the dollar
differences recorded in final column vary substantially with some cities exhibiting income gains
well in excess of reasonable booster predictions, and other cities showing a large negative
impact.  Second, actual and predicted growth on average are almost exactly the same with actual
income growth exceeding predicted growth by .003%.  It should also be noted that overall the
model estimates that the average host city experienced a reduction in income of $57.1 million
relative to the predictions of the model despite actual growth exceeding predicted growth. This
seeming contradiction is due to the poor economic performance of several relatively large cities
in the sample skewing the data.22
The magnitude of the variation of the estimates at first blush appears high.  Some host
cities (New York City, 1996, and Boston, 1986) exhibited several billion dollars in increased
economic activity while others (New York City, 1999 and 2000, and Los Angeles, 1988)
experienced billions of dollars in reduced economic impact.  The explanation for this range of
estimates is simply that the models do not explain all the variation in estimated income, and,
therefore, not all the variation can be attributable to the baseball playoffs.  In short, there are
omitted variables.  While the model fit statistics for the individual city regressions display
moderately high R-squared numbers, the standard error of the estimate for the typical city is
roughly one percent meaning that one would expect the models to predict actual economic
growth for the cities within one percentage point about two-thirds of the time. For the cities in
question, a one percent error translates into a $300 to $500 million difference for the smallest
MSAs such as Kansas City and Cincinnati and over a $3 billion difference for New York City,
the largest host city. Given the size of these large, diverse economies, the effect of even a large
event with hundreds of millions of dollars of potential impact is likely to be obscured by natural,
unexplained variations in the economy. Indeed, only three of the standardized residuals, San
Diego in 1984, Anaheim in 1982, and Oakland in 1975, are statistically significant at the 5%
level.
While it is unlikely that the models for any individual city will capture the effects of even
a large event, one would expect that across a large number of cities and years, any event that
produces a large impact would emerge on average as statistically significant. Using the
seemingly unrelated regressions approach, one can compare the standardized residuals for the
129 observations with residuals being normally distributed with a standard deviation of 1.  A test23
on the null hypothesis that the average standard residual is greater than zero provides a p-value
of 32.2 percent.  In other words, even if the games really had a no positive effect on the host
cities, then the sample results had a 32.2 percent probability of occurring. 
The seemingly unrelated regression analysis can be carried one step further.  Since the
presence of the playoff is not included in making predictions about the economic growth in a
particular city, if the championships have a significant positive effect on host economies as the
boosters suggest, then the appropriate hypothesis test would not be whether the average
standardized residual is greater than zero (meaning simply that the event had a positive economic
impact) but whether the average standardized residual is greater than some figure that essentially
represents a combination of the size of projected impact in comparison to the size of the host city
(meaning that the event had a positive economic impact of some designated magnitude.)  
This method is complicated by the fact that the number of home games played in a post-
season is subject to a great deal of variation.  As noted earlier, since 1995 a team participating in
the World Series may play as many as 11 and as few as 5 post-season games.  Between 1985 and
1994  teams could play a maximum of 8 and a minimum of 4 post-season games, and from 1969
to 1984 a team could play a maximum of 7 and a minimum of 3 post-season games.  Although
some booster studies claim a larger impact from World Series games than the rest of the playoff
games, for our the purposes of this study, all post-season games were treated identically. 
Table 3 records various estimates that combine estimates provided by MLB boosters and
those predicted by the model.  For the purpose of exposition, a $25 million post-season (in 2000
dollars) effect per game is assumed, a figure on the high end of the economic impact estimates. 
Again examining Oakland in 1972, the basic model predicted economic growth of 5.066%. 24
Since Oakland hosted 5 post-season games that year, an impact of $25 million per game would
lead one to expect the city income to increase by $125 million, or an additional 0.324%, above
the model’s prediction, for a total predicted income growth of 5.390%, or 0.024% below the
observed growth for 1973.  Using revised predicted growth rates that include the post-season
growth projections, new standardized residuals can be calculated.  A new test on the null
hypothesis that the average standard residual is greater than zero provides a p-value of 10.78
percent.  In other words, had the playoff had a positive effect of $25 million per game as asserted
by the boosters, over the twenty-nine year period covered by the data, the actual growth rates
experienced by the sample would have had only a 10.78 percent probability of occurring.  
The playoff and World Series contribution to predicted growth (and hence the standardized
residual) can be adjusted by assuming an economic impact larger or smaller than the $25 million
figure used in this example. The resulting p-values shown are shown in Table 4. 
The predicted economic impact at which the mean standardized residual is zero is $6.8
million, a figure roughly one-quarter that of the highest ex ante estimates and about half that of
the typical projections. Per game impacts of $31.0 million and $41.3 million can be rejected at
the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  While the $6.8 million figure is on low side of
booster estimates, it is much more in line with the estimates than in other studies done on mega-
events.  It is a common rule of thumb among sports economists that the conversion from ex ante
estimates to actual economic impact simply involves moving the decimal place one space to the
left.  It is, of course, an unfortunate reality when it is considered a surprise that booster numbers
approximate reality. 25
The closeness of the estimates to the actual results may be due to two factors unique to
baseball’s playoffs in comparison to the Super Bowl, Olympics, or league All-Star events. First,
the because the location of the playoffs is determined by team performance rather than some sort
of bidding process, the baseball officials have less incentive to artificially inflate the figures. 
Even the most generous ex ante estimates of a single World Series game are only 5 to 10 percent
that of the typical estimates of the Super Bowl’s impact despite roughly similar attendances.
Second, because the location of the World Series is not known in advance, less crowding out
may occur. While conventioneers and vacationers can and do intentionally plan around
scheduled events such as the Super Bowl, the World Series cannot be avoided by prior planning. 
A World Series host may, therefore  get both the mega-event as well as its regular recreational
and business travelers.
Conclusions
Major League Baseball teams have used the lure of post-season riches as an incentive for
cities to construct new stadiums at considerable public expense. Estimates of the economic
impact of baseball playoffs including a trip to the World Series on host communities have
typically ranged from about $50 million up to $250 million. We in general would urge caution
with respect to these sorts of economic impact estimates. Our detailed regression analysis reveals
that over the period 1972 to 2000, cities appearing in the MLB post-season had higher than
expected income growth by 0.003%. This is figure is not statistically significantly different than
zero, although a best guess of the economic contribution of a single post-season game is $6.8
million, roughly half that of the typical ex ante projection.26
Objective observers would be wise to view with caution the World Series economic
impact estimates provided by the boosters of MLB. Certainly building a new stadium on the
anticipation of gaining the expense back with World Series appearances is a poor gamble at best.
Even the most favorable estimates result in economic benefits that are a small fraction of the
costs of building a new stadium. Furthermore,  in a market crowded with new stadiums, a new
stadium is no longer a guarantee of post-season success. We would maintain that the World
Series strikes out as engine for economic growth.27
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TABLE 1
Regression results for Equation 1 all variables included that minimize SEE. (t-stats in
parentheses)



































































































































































































































































































































































OLS regression used in all cases except those noted by **. The Cochrane-Orcutt method was
used in these cases where the elimination of serial correlation improved model fit as measured by
the SEE. 32
TABLE 2
MLB Post-Season Contribution to Local Economies
Year Post-Season
Location






 Income +/-  Games SEE
1972 Cincinnati $   27,532,366  5.597% 5.418% -0.179% -0.237   $    (49,215) 7 0.755%
1972 Detroit 3
1972 Oakland $   38,598,078  5.066% 5.414% 0.348% 0.295   $    134,219  5 1.178%
1972 Pittsburgh $   51,202,105  3.776% 4.917% 1.141% 1.330   $    584,140  2 0.858%
1973 Baltimore $   46,313,896  4.603% 4.351% -0.252% -0.463   $   (116,791) 3 0.545%
1973 Cincinnati $   28,721,855  3.662% 4.320% 0.659% 0.872   $    189,170  2 0.755%
1973 New York City $ 224,067,408  -0.293% -0.963% -0.670% -0.530   $(1,502,179) 6 1.265%
1973 Oakland $   39,280,325 3.382% 1.768% -1.614% -1.370   $   (634,111) 5 1.178%
1974 Baltimore $   46,397,753 -0.366% 0.181% 0.547% 1.003   $    253,825  2 0.545%
1974 Los Angeles $ 164,200,866 -2.008% -0.968% 1.040% 0.775   $ 1,708,178  4 1.342%
1974 Oakland $   39,298,464 -1.354% 0.046% 1.400% 1.188   $    550,095  5 1.178%
1974 Pittsburgh $   52,975,189 -0.460% 0.286% 0.746% 0.870   $    395,129  2 0.858%
1975 Boston $ 109,672,605 -2.775% -2.454% 0.321% 0.334   $    351,970  6 0.962%
1975 Cincinnati $   27,787,908 -2.201% -2.076% 0.125% 0.166   $      34,785  5 0.755%
1975 Oakland $   39,786,592 -1.190% 1.242% 2.432% 2.064   $    967,515  1 1.178%
1975 Pittsburgh $   53,200,153  -0.372% 0.425% 0.797% 0.929   $    424,023  2 0.858%
1976 Cincinnati $   29,188,575 4.479% 5.041% 0.561% 0.743   $    163,811  3 0.755%
1976 Kansas City $   30,888,942  4.493% 5.299% 0.806% 0.902   $    248,965  2 0.893%
1976 New York City $ 211,013,795 1.908% 0.313% -1.595% -1.261   $(3,364,664) 5 1.265%
1976 Philadelphia $ 105,970,887 3.511% 3.663% 0.152% 0.284   $    161,076  2 0.536%
1977 Kansas City $   32,424,396 4.965% 4.970% 0.005% 0.006   $        1,621  3 0.893%
1977 Los Angeles $ 178,398,660 4.378% 3.976% -0.402% -0.300   $   (717,534) 5 1.342%
1977 New York City $ 213,359,650 1.280% 1.112% -0.168% -0.133   $   (359,069) 5 1.265%
1977 Philadelphia $ 108,855,312 2.770% 2.722% -0.048% -0.090   $     (52,251) 2 0.536%
1978 Kansas City $   33,672,017 4.247% 3.847% -0.400% -0.448   $   (134,688) 2 0.893%
1978 Los Angeles $ 189,323,671 4.434% 6.124% 1.690% 1.259   $ 3,199,439  5 1.342%
1978 New York City $ 215,503,232 2.132% 1.005% -1.127% -0.891   $(2,429,411) 5 1.265%
1978 Philadelphia $ 111,558,518 3.420% 2.484% -0.936% -1.747   $(1,044,188) 2 0.536%
1979 Anaheim $   53,723,585 3.919% 4.583% 0.664% 0.643   $    356,497  2 1.032%
1979 Baltimore $   51,254,426 0.134% -0.090% -0.224% -0.410   $   (114,619) 6 0.545%
1979 Cincinnati $   32,331,439 0.842% 0.658% -0.184% -0.243   $     (59,334) 1 0.755%
1979 Pittsburgh $   58,805,349 0.042% -0.137% -0.179% -0.209   $   (105,201) 4 0.858%
1980 Houston $   72,898,467 4.314% 4.109% -0.205% -0.086   $   (149,391) 3 2.383%
1980 Kansas City $   33,021,724 -1.849% -2.654% -0.805% -0.901   $   (265,747) 5 0.893%
1980 New York City $ 204,934,863 -1.622% -2.599% -0.977% -0.773   $(2,002,880) 1 1.265%
1980 Philadelphia $ 108,438,037 -2.057% -2.246% -0.189% -0.353   $   (204,986) 5 0.536%
1981 Los Angeles $ 192,451,311 0.244% 1.351% 1.107% 0.825   $ 2,130,943  5 1.342%
1981 Montreal    3
1981 New York City $ 208,286,617  0.748% 1.636% 0.888% 0.702   $ 1,848,589  5 1.265%
1981 Oakland $   47,970,341  1.766% 1.753% -0.013% -0.011   $       (6,282) 1 1.178%
1982 Anaheim $   56,131,318  1.920% -0.545% -2.465% -2.389   $(1,383,698) 2 1.032%
1982 Atlanta $   50,019,550  2.344% 1.898% -0.446% -0.432   $   (223,223) 1 1.033%
1982 Milwaukee $   33,123,282  -1.369% -0.516% 0.853% 1.017   $    282,495  6 0.838%
1982 St. Louis $   54,104,091  -0.392% 0.416% 0.808% 1.456   $    437,269  6 0.555%33
1983 Baltimore $   53,193,294  4.217% 4.472% 0.255% 0.468   $    135,733  4 0.545%
1983 Chicago $ 182,220,856  1.896% 1.881% -0.015% -0.019   $     (27,560) 2 0.796%
1983 Los Angeles $ 198,560,886  3.201% 3.386% 0.185% 0.138   $    366,785  2 1.342%
1983 Philadelphia $ 114,115,967  3.095% 3.546% 0.451% 0.841   $    514,361  5 0.536%
1984 Chicago $ 192,591,813  5.222% 5.691% 0.470% 0.590   $    904,571  2 0.796%
1984 Detroit $ 104,145,426  6.930% 6.739% -0.191% -0.175   $   (198,910) 4 1.091%
1984 Kansas City $   36,022,911  6.250% 6.883% 0.633% 0.709   $    228,025  2 0.893%
1984 San Diego $   52,431,494  7.294% 9.628% 2.334% 2.074   $ 1,223,591  5 1.125%
1985 Kansas City $   37,668,611  5.123% 4.568% -0.555% -0.621   $   (208,879) 7 0.893%
1985 Los Angeles $ 220,263,102  3.710% 4.290% 0.580% 0.432   $ 1,278,625  3 1.342%
1985 St. Louis $   61,556,496  3.439% 3.503% 0.064% 0.116   $      39,483  6 0.555%
1985 Toronto  2
1986 Anaheim $   70,276,696  5.058% 5.351% 0.293% 0.284   $    205,731  3 1.032%
1986 Boston $ 159,618,309  4.596% 6.048% 1.452% 1.509   $ 2,317,618  7 0.962%
1986 Houston $   80,828,386  0.145% -2.937% -3.082% -1.293   $(2,490,874) 3 2.383%
1986 New York City $ 255,447,527  4.456% 5.182% 0.726% 0.574   $ 1,853,434  7 1.265%
1987 Detroit $ 115,717,469  1.390% 0.059% -1.331% -1.220   $(1,539,645) 3 1.091%
1987 Minneapolis $   70,842,848  3.590% 4.114% 0.524% 1.110   $    371,121  6 0.472%
1987 San Francisco $   60,718,448  2.920% 1.315% -1.604% -0.936   $   (974,198) 3 1.713%
1987 St. Louis $   65,190,212  2.253% 2.327% 0.074% 0.133   $      48,025  7 0.555%
1988 Boston $ 178,466,897  5.390% 5.966% 0.576% 0.599   $ 1,027,982  2 0.962%
1988 Los Angeles $ 246,784,667  3.972% 2.606% -1.366% -1.018   $(3,371,558) 6 1.342%
1988 New York City $ 279,496,535  3.595% 5.389% 1.794% 1.418   $ 5,012,810  3 1.265%
1988 Oakland $   64,525,726  4.517% 4.496% -0.021% -0.017   $     (13,253) 5 1.178%
1989 Chicago $ 221,202,789  2.093% 0.933% -1.161% -1.459   $(2,567,835) 2 0.796%
1989 Oakland $   66,459,694  3.711% 2.997% -0.713% -0.606   $   (474,159) 4 1.178%
1989 San Francisco $   65,086,256  2.854% 2.320% -0.534% -0.312   $   (347,767) 5 1.713%
1989 Toronto    3
1990 Boston $ 176,411,810  -0.369% -1.999% -1.630% -1.694   $(2,874,743) 2 0.962%
1990 Cincinnati $   40,611,884  1.337% 2.291% 0.954% 1.264   $    387,478  5 0.755%
1990 Oakland $   68,068,414  2.218% 2.421% 0.203% 0.172   $    137,972  4 1.178%
1990 Pittsburgh $   63,197,042  2.305% 1.446% -0.859% -1.002   $   (543,056) 3 0.858%
1991 Atlanta $   82,750,474  1.094% 0.299% -0.795% -0.770   $   (657,964) 6 1.033%
1991 Minneapolis $   76,478,821  0.232% -0.130% -0.362% -0.767   $   (276,791) 6 0.472%
1991 Pittsburgh $   64,553,201  0.770% 0.702% -0.068% -0.079   $     (43,705) 4 0.858%
1991 Toronto    3
1992 Atlanta $   87,316,596  4.739% 5.518% 0.779% 0.754   $    680,145  7 1.033%
1992 Oakland $   69,152,758  2.863% 3.599% 0.736% 0.624   $    508,697  3 1.178%
1992 Pittsburgh $   64,679,884  1.868% 2.146% 0.278% 0.324   $    179,929  3 0.858%
1992 Toronto    6
1993 Atlanta $   91,150,000  3.778% 4.390% 0.612% 0.593   $    558,053  3 1.033%
1993 Chicago $ 235,482,447  1.257% 0.678% -0.579% -0.727   $(1,363,194) 3 0.796%
1993 Philadelphia $ 147,001,676  -0.024% -0.093% -0.069% -0.129   $   (101,809) 6 0.536%
1993 Toronto    6
1994 Not Held   
1995 Atlanta $ 101,342,437  5.341% 5.519% 0.178% 0.173   $    180,583  7 1.033%
1995 Boston $ 185,337,596  3.075% 2.457% -0.618% -0.643   $(1,145,636) 1 0.962%
1995 Cincinnati $   43,769,041  2.169% 1.464% -0.705% -0.934   $   (308,444) 3 0.755%
1995 Cleveland $   64,491,874  0.911% 1.219% 0.308% 0.425   $    198,844  8 0.726%
1995 Denver $   57,896,381  4.952% 5.568% 0.615% 0.467   $    356,327  2 1.318%
1995 Los Angeles $ 243,788,401  0.827% 1.247% 0.420% 0.313   $ 1,024,598  2 1.342%
1995 New York City $ 303,606,418  2.261% 3.402% 1.141% 0.902   $ 3,462,766  2 1.265%34
1995 Seattle $   72,687,993  2.808% 2.657% -0.150% -0.091   $   (109,267) 6 1.645%
1996 Atlanta $ 107,618,019  5.078% 6.192% 1.114% 1.079   $ 1,199,351  8 1.033%
1996 Baltimore $   72,432,741  1.125% 1.114% -0.011% -0.021   $       (8,146) 5 0.545%
1996 Cleveland $   64,698,841  -0.084% 0.321% 0.405% 0.558   $    262,030  2 0.726%
1996 Dallas $   39,723,254  3.631% 2.590% -1.041% -0.801   $   (413,525) 2 1.300%
1996 Los Angeles $ 246,885,596  0.802% 1.270% 0.468% 0.349   $ 1,156,521  2 1.342%
1996 New York City $ 314,874,059  1.741% 3.711% 1.970% 1.558   $ 6,203,856  7 1.265%
1996 San Diego $   72,557,088  1.650% 3.020% 1.370% 1.217   $    993,746  1 1.125%
1996 St. Louis $   73,782,306  1.286% 1.037% -0.249% -0.448   $   (183,718) 5 0.555%
1997 Atlanta $ 113,115,220  7.040% 5.108% -1.932% -1.870   $(2,185,310) 5 1.033%
1997 Baltimore $   75,161,009  2.765% 3.767% 1.002% 1.837   $    752,831  5 0.545%
1997 Cleveland $   66,274,795  1.504% 2.436% 0.932% 1.284   $    617,569  9 0.726%
1997 Houston $ 121,049,093  5.312% 7.873% 2.561% 1.075   $ 3,100,282  1 2.383%
1997 Miami $   52,492,918  2.985% 2.229% -0.755% -0.561   $   (396,511) 9 1.347%
1997 New York City $ 320,105,629  3.705% 1.661% -2.044% -1.616   $(6,541,422) 2 1.265%
1997 San Francisco $   75,463,688  4.578% 3.102% -1.476% -0.862   $(1,114,154) 1 1.713%
1997 Seattle $   81,574,743  5.673% 6.590% 0.916% 0.557   $    747,351  2 1.645%
1998 Atlanta $ 123,206,887  8.599% 8.922% 0.323% 0.312   $    397,443  5 1.033%
1998 Boston $ 210,706,935  6.383% 5.832% -0.551% -0.573   $(1,161,440) 2 0.962%
1998 Chicago $ 280,446,881  5.507% 5.387% -0.121% -0.152   $   (338,177) 1 0.796%
1998 Cleveland $   68,280,954  3.860% 3.027% -0.833% -1.148   $   (568,780) 5 0.726%
1998 Dallas $   45,960,341  8.238% 8.273% 0.035% 0.027   $      15,887  1 1.300%
1998 Houston $ 131,932,442  7.650% 8.991% 1.340% 0.562   $ 1,768,513  2 2.383%
1998 New York City $ 339,327,238  5.642% 6.005% 0.363% 0.287   $ 1,230,980  7 1.265%
1998 San Diego $   82,195,355  6.591% 8.454% 1.863% 1.656   $ 1,531,165  7 1.125%
1999 Atlanta $ 130,105,709  6.144% 5.599% -0.545% -0.527   $   (708,581) 7 1.033%
1999 Boston $ 219,553,252  3.838% 4.198% 0.360% 0.375   $    791,267  5 0.962%
1999 Cleveland $   68,698,720  0.417% 0.612% 0.195% 0.269   $    133,963  3 0.726%
1999 Dallas $   47,895,370  5.435% 4.210% -1.225% -0.942   $   (586,668) 1 1.300%
1999 Houston $ 134,728,805  5.461% 2.120% -3.342% -1.402   $(4,502,551) 2 2.383%
1999 New York City $ 348,859,366  4.415% 2.809% -1.606% -1.270   $(5,602,244) 11 1.265%
1999 Phoenix $   84,996,706  5.288% 3.870% -1.418% -0.933   $(1,205,352) 2 1.519%
2000 Atlanta $ 136,688,674  6.225% 5.060% -1.165% -1.128   $(1,592,826) 1 1.033%
2000 Chicago $ 292,809,967  2.761% 2.596% -0.165% -0.208   $   (483,992) 2 0.796%
2000 New York City $ 365,949,852  6.046% 4.899% -1.147% -0.907   $(4,197,586) 15 1.265%
2000 Oakland $   95,106,610  7.017% 8.744% 1.727% 1.466   $ 1,642,264  3 1.178%
2000 San Francisco $   99,323,357  9.875% 11.879% 2.004% 1.169   $ 1,990,014  2 1.713%
2000 Seattle $   98,341,310  5.304% 2.193% -3.110% -1.891   $(3,058,854) 4 1.645%
2000 St. Louis $   81,603,230  2.004% 1.990% -0.014% -0.025   $     (11,424) 4 0.555%
Average 3.015% 3.018% 0.003% 0.041   $     (59,197) 3.835
TABLE 3
MLB Post-Season Contribution to Local Economies
Year Post-Season
Location










1972 Cincinnati $   27,532,366  $   175,000 0.636% 5.597% 6.233% 5.418% -0.814% -1.079
1972 Detroit
1972 Oakland $   38,598,078  $125,000  0.324% 5.066% 5.390% 5.414% 0.024% 0.020
1972 Pittsburgh $   51,202,105  $  50,000 0.098% 3.776% 3.874% 4.917% 1.043% 1.217
1973 Baltimore $   46,313,896  $  75,000  0.162% 4.603% 4.765% 4.351% -0.414% -0.760
1973 Cincinnati $   28,721,855  $  50,000 0.174% 3.662% 3.836% 4.320% 0.485% 0.642
1973 NYC (NL) $ 224,067,408  $150,000  0.067% -0.293% -0.226% -0.963% -0.737% -0.583
1973 Oakland $   39,280,325  $125,000  0.318% 3.382% 3.700% 1.768% -1.933% -1.640
1974 Baltimore $   46,397,753  $  50,000  0.108% -0.366% -0.258% 0.181% 0.439% 0.806
1974 Los Angeles $ 164,200,866  $100,000  0.061% -2.008% -1.947% -0.968% 0.979% 0.730
1974 Oakland $   39,298,464  $125,000  0.318% -1.354% -1.036% 0.046% 1.082% 0.918
1974 Pittsburgh $   52,975,189  $  50,000  0.094% -0.460% -0.365% 0.286% 0.651% 0.760
1975 Boston $ 109,672,605  $150,000  0.137% -2.775% -2.638% -2.454% 0.184% 0.191
1975 Cincinnati $   27,787,908  $125,000  0.450% -2.201% -1.752% -2.076% -0.325% -0.430
1975 Oakland $   39,786,592  $  25,000  0.063% -1.190% -1.127% 1.242% 2.369% 2.011
1975 Pittsburgh $   53,200,153  $  50,000  0.094% -0.372% -0.278% 0.425% 0.703% 0.820
1976 Cincinnati $   29,188,575  $  75,000 0.257% 4.479% 4.736% 5.041% 0.304% 0.403
1976 Kansas City $   30,888,942  $  50,000 0.162% 4.493% 4.655% 5.299% 0.644% 0.721
1976 NYC (AL) $ 211,013,795  $125,000  0.059% 1.908% 1.967% 0.313% -1.654% -1.308
1976 Philadelphia $ 105,970,887  $  50,000 0.047% 3.511% 3.558% 3.663% 0.105% 0.196
1977 Kansas City $   32,424,396  $  75,000 0.231% 4.965% 5.196% 4.970% -0.226% -0.253
1977 Los Angeles $ 178,398,660  $125,000  0.070% 4.378% 4.448% 3.976% -0.472% -0.352
1977 NYC (AL) $ 213,359,650  $125,000  0.059% 1.280% 1.339% 1.112% -0.227% -0.179
1977 Philadelphia $ 108,855,312  $  50,000  0.046% 2.770% 2.816% 2.722% -0.094% -0.175
1978 Kansas City $   33,672,017  $  50,000 0.148% 4.247% 4.395% 3.847% -0.548% -0.614
1978 Los Angeles $ 189,323,671  $125,000  0.066% 4.434% 4.500% 6.124% 1.624% 1.210
1978 NYC (AL) $ 215,503,232  $125,000  0.058% 2.132% 2.190% 1.005% -1.185% -0.937
1978 Philadelphia $ 111,558,518  $  50,000  0.045% 3.420% 3.465% 2.484% -0.981% -1.830
1979 Anaheim $   53,723,585  $  50,000 0.093% 3.919% 4.012% 4.583% 0.571% 0.553
1979 Baltimore $   51,254,426  $150,000  0.293% 0.134% 0.427% -0.090% -0.516% -0.947
1979 Cincinnati $   32,331,439  $  25,000 0.077% 0.842% 0.919% 0.658% -0.261% -0.346
1979 Pittsburgh $   58,805,349  $100,000  0.170% 0.042% 0.212% -0.137% -0.349% -0.407
1980 Houston $   72,898,467  $  75,000  0.103% 4.314% 4.417% 4.109% -0.308% -0.129
1980 Kansas City $   33,021,724  $125,000  0.379% -1.849% -1.470% -2.654% -1.183% -1.325
1980 NYC (AL) $ 204,934,863  $  25,000  0.012% -1.622% -1.610% -2.599% -0.990% -0.782
1980 Philadelphia $ 108,438,037  $125,000  0.115% -2.057% -1.942% -2.246% -0.304% -0.568
1981 Los Angeles $ 192,451,311  $125,000  0.065% 0.244% 0.309% 1.351% 1.042% 0.777
1981 Montreal 
1981 NYC (AL) $ 208,286,617  $125,000  0.060% 0.748% 0.808% 1.636% 0.828% 0.654
1981 Oakland $   47,970,341  $  25,000  0.052% 1.766% 1.818% 1.753% -0.065% -0.055
1982 Anaheim $   56,131,318  $  50,000  0.089% 1.920% 2.009% -0.545% -2.554% -2.476
1982 Atlanta $   50,019,550  $  25,000  0.050% 2.344% 2.394% 1.898% -0.496% -0.480
1982 Milwaukee $   33,123,282  $150,000  0.453% -1.369% -0.916% -0.516% 0.400% 0.477
1982 St. Louis $   54,104,091  $150,000  0.277% -0.392% -0.115% 0.416% 0.531% 0.95636
1983 Baltimore $   53,193,294  $100,000  0.188% 4.217% 4.405% 4.472% 0.067% 0.123
1983 Chicago $ 182,220,856  $  50,000  0.027% 1.896% 1.924% 1.881% -0.043% -0.053
1983 Los Angeles $ 198,560,886  $  50,000 0.025% 3.201% 3.226% 3.386% 0.160% 0.119
1983 Philadelphia $ 114,115,967  $125,000  0.110% 3.095% 3.205% 3.546% 0.341% 0.637
1984 Chicago $ 192,591,813  $  50,000  0.026% 5.222% 5.248% 5.691% 0.444% 0.558
1984 Detroit $ 104,145,426  $100,000  0.096% 6.930% 7.026% 6.739% -0.287% -0.263
1984 Kansas City $   36,022,911  $  50,000 0.139% 6.250% 6.389% 6.883% 0.494% 0.553
1984 San Diego $   52,431,494  $125,000 0.238% 7.294% 7.532% 9.628% 2.095% 1.863
1985 Kansas City $   37,668,611  $175,000  0.465% 5.123% 5.588% 4.568% -1.019% -1.141
1985 Los Angeles $ 220,263,102  $  75,000 0.034% 3.710% 3.744% 4.290% 0.546% 0.407
1985 St. Louis $   61,556,496  $150,000  0.244% 3.439% 3.683% 3.503% -0.180% -0.323
1985 Toronto 
1986 Anaheim $   70,276,696  $  75,000 0.107% 5.058% 5.165% 5.351% 0.186% 0.180
1986 Boston $ 159,618,309  $175,000  0.110% 4.596% 4.706% 6.048% 1.342% 1.395
1986 Houston $   80,828,386  $  75,000  0.093% 0.145% 0.237% -2.937% -3.174% -1.332
1986 NYC $ 255,447,527  $175,000  0.069% 4.456% 4.525% 5.182% 0.657% 0.520
1987 Detroit $ 115,717,469  $  75,000  0.065% 1.390% 1.454% 0.059% -1.395% -1.279
1987 Minneapolis $   70,842,848  $150,000 0.212% 3.590% 3.802% 4.114% 0.312% 0.662
1987 San Fran. $   60,718,448  $  75,000 0.124% 2.920% 3.043% 1.315% -1.728% -1.008
1987 St. Louis $   65,190,212  $175,000  0.268% 2.253% 2.521% 2.327% -0.195% -0.351
1988 Boston $ 178,466,897  $  50,000  0.028% 5.390% 5.418% 5.966% 0.548% 0.570
1988 Los Angeles $ 246,784,667  $150,000  0.061% 3.972% 4.033% 2.606% -1.427% -1.063
1988 NYC $ 279,496,535  $  75,000  0.027% 3.595% 3.622% 5.389% 1.767% 1.397
1988 Oakland $   64,525,726  $125,000  0.194% 4.517% 4.710% 4.496% -0.214% -0.182
1989 Chicago $ 221,202,789  $  50,000  0.023% 2.093% 2.116% 0.933% -1.183% -1.487
1989 Oakland $   66,459,694  $100,000  0.150% 3.711% 3.861% 2.997% -0.864% -0.733
1989 San Fran. $   65,086,256  $125,000  0.192% 2.854% 3.046% 2.320% -0.726% -0.424
1989 Toronto 
1990 Boston $ 176,411,810  $  50,000  0.028% -0.369% -0.341% -1.999% -1.658% -1.724
1990 Cincinnati $   40,611,884  $125,000 0.308% 1.337% 1.645% 2.291% 0.646% 0.856
1990 Oakland $   68,068,414  $100,000  0.147% 2.218% 2.365% 2.421% 0.056% 0.047
1990 Pittsburgh $   63,197,042  $  75,000  0.119% 2.305% 2.424% 1.446% -0.978% -1.140
1991 Atlanta $   82,750,474  $150,000  0.181% 1.094% 1.275% 0.299% -0.976% -0.945
1991 Minneapolis $   76,478,821  $150,000  0.196% 0.232% 0.428% -0.130% -0.558% -1.183
1991 Pittsburgh $   64,553,201  $100,000  0.155% 0.770% 0.925% 0.702% -0.223% -0.260
1991 Toronto 
1992 Atlanta $   87,316,596  $175,000  0.200% 4.739% 4.939% 5.518% 0.579% 0.560
1992 Oakland $   69,152,758  $  75,000 0.108% 2.863% 2.972% 3.599% 0.627% 0.532
1992 Pittsburgh $   64,679,884  $  75,000 0.116% 1.868% 1.984% 2.146% 0.162% 0.189
1992 Toronto
1993 Atlanta $   91,150,000  $  75,000 0.082% 3.778% 3.860% 4.390% 0.530% 0.513
1993 Chicago $ 235,482,447  $  75,000  0.032% 1.257% 1.289% 0.678% -0.611% -0.767
1993 Philadelphia $ 147,001,676  $150,000  0.102% -0.024% 0.078% -0.093% -0.171% -0.320
1993 Toronto 
1994 Not Held
1995 Atlanta $ 101,342,437  $175,000  0.173% 5.341% 5.514% 5.519% 0.006% 0.005
1995 Boston $ 185,337,596  $  25,000  0.013% 3.075% 3.088% 2.457% -0.632% -0.657
1995 Cincinnati $   43,769,041  $  75,000 0.171% 2.169% 2.340% 1.464% -0.876% -1.161
1995 Cleveland $   64,491,874  $200,000  0.310% 0.911% 1.221% 1.219% -0.002% -0.002
1995 Denver $   57,896,381  $  50,000 0.086% 4.952% 5.039% 5.568% 0.529% 0.402
1995 Los Angeles $ 243,788,401  $  50,000 0.021% 0.827% 0.848% 1.247% 0.400% 0.298
1995 NYC $ 303,606,418  $  50,000  0.016% 2.261% 2.277% 3.402% 1.124% 0.88937
1995 Seattle $   72,687,993  $150,000  0.206% 2.808% 3.014% 2.657% -0.357% -0.217
1996 Atlanta $ 107,618,019  $200,000  0.186% 5.078% 5.264% 6.192% 0.929% 0.899
1996 Baltimore $   72,432,741  $125,000  0.173% 1.125% 1.298% 1.114% -0.184% -0.337
1996 Cleveland $   64,698,841  $  50,000 0.077% -0.084% -0.007% 0.321% 0.328% 0.452
1996 Dallas $   39,723,254  $  50,000  0.126% 3.631% 3.757% 2.590% -1.167% -0.898
1996 Los Angeles $ 246,885,596  $  50,000 0.020% 0.802% 0.822% 1.270% 0.448% 0.334
1996 NYC $ 314,874,059  $175,000  0.056% 1.741% 1.797% 3.711% 1.915% 1.514
1996 San Diego $   72,557,088  $  25,000 0.034% 1.650% 1.684% 3.020% 1.335% 1.187
1996 St. Louis $   73,782,306  $125,000  0.169% 1.286% 1.455% 1.037% -0.418% -0.754
1997 Atlanta $ 113,115,220  $125,000  0.111% 7.040% 7.151% 5.108% -2.042% -1.977
1997 Baltimore $   75,161,009  $125,000  0.166% 2.765% 2.931% 3.767% 0.835% 1.532
1997 Cleveland $   66,274,795  $225,000 0.339% 1.504% 1.843% 2.436% 0.592% 0.816
1997 Houston $ 121,049,093  $  25,000  0.021% 5.312% 5.333% 7.873% 2.541% 1.066
1997 Miami $   52,492,918  $225,000  0.429% 2.985% 3.413% 2.229% -1.184% -0.879
1997 NYC $ 320,105,629  $  50,000  0.016% 3.705% 3.721% 1.661% -2.059% -1.628
1997 San Fran. $   75,463,688  $  25,000 0.033% 4.578% 4.612% 3.102% -1.510% -0.881
1997 Seattle $   81,574,743  $  50,000 0.061% 5.673% 5.735% 6.590% 0.855% 0.520
1998 Atlanta $ 123,206,887  $125,000  0.101% 8.599% 8.700% 8.922% 0.221% 0.214
1998 Boston $ 210,706,935  $  50,000  0.024% 6.383% 6.407% 5.832% -0.575% -0.598
1998 Chicago $ 280,446,881  $  25,000  0.009% 5.507% 5.516% 5.387% -0.129% -0.163
1998 Cleveland $   68,280,954  $125,000  0.183% 3.860% 4.043% 3.027% -1.016% -1.400
1998 Dallas $   45,960,341  $  25,000  0.054% 8.238% 8.292% 8.273% -0.020% -0.015
1998 Houston $ 131,932,442  $  50,000  0.038% 7.650% 7.688% 8.991% 1.303% 0.547
1998 NYC $ 339,327,238  $175,000  0.052% 5.642% 5.694% 6.005% 0.311% 0.246
1998 San Diego $   82,195,355  $175,000 0.213% 6.591% 6.804% 8.454% 1.650% 1.467
1999 Atlanta $ 130,105,709  $175,000  0.135% 6.144% 6.279% 5.599% -0.679% -0.657
1999 Boston $ 219,553,252  $125,000  0.057% 3.838% 3.895% 4.198% 0.303% 0.315
1999 Cleveland $   68,698,720  $  75,000 0.109% 0.417% 0.526% 0.612% 0.086% 0.118
1999 Dallas $   47,895,370  $  25,000  0.052% 5.435% 5.487% 4.210% -1.277% -0.982
1999 Houston $ 134,728,805  $  50,000  0.037% 5.461% 5.499% 2.120% -3.379% -1.418
1999 NYC (both) $ 348,859,366  $275,000  0.079% 4.415% 4.494% 2.809% -1.685% -1.332
1999 Phoenix $   84,996,706  $  50,000  0.059% 5.288% 5.347% 3.870% -1.477% -0.972
2000 Atlanta $ 136,688,674  $  25,000  0.018% 6.225% 6.243% 5.060% -1.184% -1.146
2000 Chicago $ 292,809,967  $  50,000  0.017% 2.761% 2.778% 2.596% -0.182% -0.229
2000 NYC (both) $ 365,949,852  $375,000  0.102% 6.046% 6.148% 4.899% -1.250% -0.988
2000 Oakland $   95,106,610  $  75,000 0.079% 7.017% 7.096% 8.744% 1.648% 1.399
2000 San Fran. $   99,323,357  $  50,000 0.050% 9.875% 9.926% 11.879% 1.953% 1.140
2000 Seattle $   98,341,310  $100,000  0.102% 5.304% 5.405% 2.193% -3.212% -1.952
2000 St. Louis $   81,603,230  $100,000  0.123% 2.004% 2.127% 1.990% -0.137% -0.246
 3.015% 3.144% 3.018% -0.126% -0.11038
TABLE 4
Probabilities for Various Levels of Economic Impact Induced by the MLB post-season  
Economic Impact per post-season
game hosted









      $0        67.85%
negative 32.15%39
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Akron, OH 676,214 59 695,781 77 1972-2000    
Albany, NY  797,010 50 876,129 68 1969-2000    
Atlanta, GA 1,742,220 16 4,144,774 9 1972-2000    
Austin, TX 382,835 88 1,263,559 47 1972-2000    
Baltimore, MD  2,072,804 12 2,557,003 18 1972-2000    
Bergen, NJ 1,354,671 26 1,374,345 44 1969-2000    
 (State data 1969-2000)   
Birmingham, AL 718,286 54 922,820 67 1970-2000    
 (State data 1970-1971)   
Boston, MA 5,182,413 4 6,067,510 4 1972-2000    
Buffalo, NY 1,344,024 27 1,168,552 52 1969-2000    
 (Average of cities)   
Charlotte, NC 819,691 49 1,508,050 42 1972-2000    
Chicago, IL 7,041,834 2 8,289,936 3 1972-2000    
Cincinnati, OH 1,431,316 21 1,649,228 34 1969-2000    
Cleveland, OH 2,402,527 11 2,250,096 24 1969-2000    
Columbus, OH 1,104,257 33 1,544,794 41 1972-2000    
Dallas, TX 1,576,589 18 3,541,099 10 1972-2000    
Dayton, OH 963,574 42  950,177 65 1969-2000    
Denver, CO 1,089,416 34 2,120,775 25 1977-2000    
Detroit, MI 4,476,558 6 4,444,693 7 1976-2000    
Fort Lauderdale, FL 595,651 70 1,632,071 36 1969-2000    
 (State data 1988-2000)   
Fort Worth, TX 766,903 51 1,713,122 30 1976-2000    
 (State data 1976-1983)   
Fresno, CA 449,383 79 925,883 66 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
Grand Rapids, MI 753,936 52 1,091,986 59 1976-2000    
Greensboro, NC 829,797 48 1,255,125 48 1972-2000    
Greenville, SC 605,084 67 965,407 63 1969-2000    
 (State data 1969)   
Hartford, CT 1,021,033 39 1,150,619 53 1969-2000    
Honolulu, HI 603,438 68 875,670 69 1972-2000    
Houston, TX 1,872,148 15 4,199,526 8 1972-2000    
Indianapolis, IN 1,229,904 30 1,612,538 37 1989-2000    
Jacksonville, FL 610,471 66 1,103,911 57 1972-2000    
 (State data 1988-2000)   
Kansas City, MO 1,365,715 25 1,781,537 28 1972-2000    40
Las Vegas, NV 297,628 116 1,582,679 39 1972-2000    
Los Angeles, CA 6,989,910 3 9,546,597 1 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
Louisville, KY 893,311 43 1,027,058 61 1972-2000    
Memphis, TN 848,113 45 1,138,484 54 1972-2000    
Miami, FL 1,249,884 29 2,265,208 23 1969-2000    
 (State data 1988-2000)   
Middlesex, NJ 836,616 47 1,173,533 51 1969-2000    
 (State data 1969-2000)   
Milwaukee, WI 1,395,326 23 1,501,615 43 1969-2000    
Minneapolis, MN 1,991,610 13 2,979,245 13 1972-2000    
Monmouth, NJ 650,177 62 1,130,698 56 1969-2000    
 (State data 1969-2000)   
Nashville, TN 689,753 57 1,235,818 49 1972-2000    
Nassau, NY 2,516,514 9 2,759,245 16 1969-2000    
New Haven, CT 1,527,930 19 1,708,336 31 1969-2000    
 (Average of cities)   
New Orleans, LA 1,134,406 31 1,337,171 46 1972-2000    
New York, NY 9,024,022 1 9,321,820 2 1969-2000    
Newark, NJ 1,988,239 14 2,035,127 26 1969-2000    
 (State data 1969-2000)   
Norfolk, VA 1,076,672 36 1,574,204 40 1972-2000     
 (State data 1973-1996)   
Oakland, CA 1,606,461 17 2,402,553 21 1969-2000    
 (State data 1969-1987)   
Oklahoma City, OK 691,473      56 1,085,282 60 1969-2000    
Orange County, CA 1,376,796 24 2,856,493 14 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
Orlando, FL 510,189 76 1,655,966 33 1972-2000    
 (State data 1988-2000)   
Philadelphia, PA 4,829,078 5 5,104,291 5 1972-2000    
Phoenix, AZ 1,013,400 40 3,276,392 12 1972-2000    
 (State data 1972-1987)   
Pittsburgh, PA 2,683,385 8 2,356,275 22 1972-2000    
Portland, OR 1,064,099 37 1,924,591 27 1972-2000    
Providence, RI 839,909 46 964,594 64 1969-2000    
Raleigh-Durham, NC 526,723 73 1,195,922 50 1972-2000    
Richmond, VA 673,990 60 999,325 62 1972-2000    
Riverside, CA 1,122,165 32 3,280,236 11 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
Rochester, NY 1,005,722 41 1,098,314 58 1969-2000    
Sacramento, CA 737,534 53 1,638,474 35 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
St. Louis, MO 2,412,381 10 2,606,023 17 1972-2000    41
Salt Lake City, UT 677,500 58 1,337,221 45 1972-2000    
San Antonio, TX 892,602 44 1,599,378 38 1972-2000    
San Diego, CA 1,340,989 28 2,824,809 15 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
San Francisco, CA 1,482,030 20 1,731,716 29 1969-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
San Jose, CA 1,033,442 38 1,683,908 32 1972-2000    
 (State data 1982-1987)   
Scranton, PA 650,418 61 623,543 84 1972-2000    
(State data 1983-1984)   
Seattle, WA 1,430,592 22 2,418,121 19 1972-2000    
 (State data 1982-2000)   
Syracuse, NY 708,325 55 731,969 73 1969-2000    
Tampa, FL 1,082,821 35 2,403,934 20 1972-2000    
 (State data 1988-2000)   
Tulsa, OK 519,537 74 804,774 71 1969-2000    
Washington, DC 3,150,087 7 4,948,213 6 1972-2000    
W. Palm Beach, FL 336,706 105 1,136,136 55 1969-2000    
 (State data 1988-2000)   
Complete data on population and income were available for all cities from 1969 to 2000.
This implies that data on income growth and income growth lagged one year were available from
1971 to 2000. Data regarding state and local taxes as a percentage of state GDP were available
for all cities from 1970 to 2000 and were obtained from the Tax Foundation in Washington, D.C. 
Wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics Survey were
available for cities as described above. When city data were not available, state wage data were
used in its place. When possible, the state wage data was adjusted to reflect differences between
existing state wage data and existing city wage data. For MSAs that included several primary
cities, the wages of the cities were averaged together to create an MSA wage as noted in Table
A1. 
The “Other” dummy variable was included for cities highly dependent on oil revenues
including Denver, Ft. Worth, and Houston. For Denver, the variable is set at a value of one for42
the bust years of 1985-1988.  For Ft. Worth the variable was set at a value of 1 for boom years,
1974-1976 and 1979-1981, and at -1 for the bust years, 1985-1988. For Houston the firsts
variable was set at a value of 1 for boom years, 1974-1976 and 1979-1981, and the second
variable was set at 1 for the bust years, 1985-1988.  The “Other” dummy variables were also set
at a value of 1 for the years 1992 and 1993 for the city of Miami to account for the impact of
Hurricane Andrew. 
Income and population data were obtained from the Regional Economic Information
System at the University of Virginia, which derives its data from the Department of Commerce
statistics. 4344
Table of Economic impacts
City Year World Series postseason 2000 dollars
Cleveland 1995 $10 $10 $11.3
Cleveland 1997 $7.2 $5.3 $7.7
Chicago 1993 $22.5 $22.5 $26.8
Florida 1997 $15.5 $16.6
Florida 1997 $17.3 $17.3 $18.5
Atlanta 1995 $8.7 $9.8
NYC 1998 5.9-8.1 15.5 $16.5
NYC 1999 $12.4-15.5 4.7-8.1 $16.0
NYC 2000 $25 $25
Anaheim 2002 $10 $9.6
St. Louis 2002 $2.1 $2.1
Arizona 2001 $18 $17.2